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     In September 2007, Northern Rock, one of the most significant retail and commercial 
banking institutions in UK and a substantial mortgage lender, after being largely affected 
by the problems in credit markets triggered by the US subprime crisis, sought for a 
liquidity support facility in order to replace money market funding. Bank of England took 
the decision to extend a loan facility to the distressed institution. Indeed, by January 
2008, it had borrowed to Northern Rock more than USD 25 billion. A month later and 
after the weakness of Northern Rock to find a commercial buyer that would commit to 
repay taxpayers’ money, the bank was eventually nationalised by the British Government 
that effectively took ownership away from its shareholders. 
     The government financial aid provided to Northern Rock has been officially recorded 
as the first bank bailout after the eruption of the crisis in August 2007. This was the 
prelude of a series of far-reaching and urgent rescue efforts that took place in the 
financial services industry during the late 2000s crisis. Nevertheless, as it is almost 
always the case, every coin has two sides. On 4 October 2007, Miami Valley Bank was 
hit by the credit crunch and shut down by the US federal regulatory authorities. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took receivership of the failed bank and 
all insured deposit accounts (that is up to $100,000) were transferred to an assuming 
institution. Hence, Miami Valley was the first commercial banking institution to be failed 
in the financial meltdown. The collapse of Miami Valley Bank was followed by those of 
Douglas National Bank and Hume Bank in early 2008. Importantly, the number of 
failures increased in a geometric progression since then. In particular, for the period 
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starting from early September 2007 and extending until March 2011, there have been 
recorded 293 commercial bank collapses in US and the FDIC has been appointed receiver 
of all these bankrupt institutions. 
     According to the above discussion, the U.S. federal authorities as well as the EU and 
several other national authorities have provided substantial financial support to many 
banking organizations while, at the same time, have let numerous others to go bankrupt 
that also incurred massive losses on the system. A question that comes up naturally is 
why this was allowed to happen. Was it simply because some particular institutions were 
considered important and big enough to save in the sense that a collapse of any of them 
could trigger contagious defaults, whereas some others were perceived as “too-small-to-
rescue” in that their failure would have no material impact on their counterparts, let alone 
on the system as a whole?1 Is, indeed, the size and the systemic importance of banking 
institutions the fundamental factors that make the authorities to treat them differently or it 
is also that the failed banks have gone really badly in terms of performance and risk-
taking -even worse than those that were bailed out- and this was the main reason why no 
financial aid was provided to them. In other words, was it the authorities that were 
reluctant to help some part of the problem banks to stay afloat because they were 
considered as too-small-to-save, or these banks were of so poor performance that were 
not capable of withstanding some serious shocks whatsoever?  
     To provide concrete answers to the aforementioned questions, we empirically 
investigate the relationship between bank performance and risk with bank size using a 
sample that contains all troubled banks in the U.S. market in the late 2000s crisis. Put 
differently, we categorise all problem banks (both assisted and failed) in different size 
groups and then test for any differences in the performance and risk-taking behaviour 
among size groups. More specifically, we first identify all banking organisations that 
either failed or were bailed out during the late 2000s crisis. Failed banks are formally 
defined as the insured institutions that have been closed requiring disbursements by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We collect the relevant information from 
                                                 
1 In September 1984, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in US made a public distinction 
for the first time between systemically and non-systemically important banking institutions announcing that 
eleven from a total of approximately 14,000 banks were considered as TBTF and as such they would be 
offered full deposit insurance, whereas all the rest would remain partially covered. 
 
 
the official website of FDIC. Bailed-out banks, on the other hand, refer to those that 
received funding from TARP. The relevant list of TARP recipients is obtained from the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury.  
     We expect the rescued institutions to perform generally better and take lower risk 
compared to the failed ones. This could explain why the latter group of banks has been 
left by the authorities to go bankrupt. However, our empirical findings show that both 
groups performed equally bad before the onset of the crisis taking high-risk investment 
decisions and operating poorly in terms of efficiency and productivity. This is to say, it is 
not that the overall performance and the risk-taking behaviour of the non-rescued banks 
were so bad that they had no alternative but to go bankrupt. On the contrary, authorities 
provided no financial aid to the banks that failed during the crisis simply because they 
were of little or no importance for the financial system as whole. This implies that it is 
indeed the degree of systemic importance of the financial institutions, which makes the 
authorities to treat them differently. Along the same lines, size is found to be one of the 
main determinants of bail-out governmental policies. Such a bail-out strategy is very 
likely to create higher incentives for banking firms to become bigger rather than safer 
simply because regulators seem to be reluctant to help a well-performed, non-risky bank 
to stay afloat if the bank is not viewed as being important enough for the entire system. In 
addition, small-sized banks which are not considered by the authorities to be systemically 
important and hence are not protected by bail out policies is likely to take higher risk 
when the bailout probability of the protected banks is increased.  
 
